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ABSTRACT
We examine how credit constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment
and thereby volatility and growth. We first develop a simple growth model where firms engage in
two types of investment: a short-term one and a long-term productivity-enhancing one. Because it
takes longer to complete, long-term investment has a relatively less procyclical return but also a
higher liquidity risk. Under complete financial markets, long-term investment is countercyclical, thus
mitigating volatility. But when firms face tight credit constraints, long-term investment turns
procyclical, thus amplifying volatility. Tighter credit therefore leads to both higher aggregate
volatility and lower mean growth for a given total investment rate. We next confront the model with
a panel of countries over the period 1960-2000 and find that a lower degree of financial development
predicts a higher sensitivity of both the composition of investment and mean growth to exogenous




















manova@fas.harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The modern theory of business cycles gives a central position to productivity shocks and the role of
ﬁnancial markets in the propagation of these shocks; but it takes the entire productivity process as
exogenous. The modern theory of growth, on the other hand, gives a central position to endogenous
productivity growth and the role of ﬁnancial markets in the growth process; but it focuses on trends,
largely ignoring shocks and cycles.1
The goal of this paper is to build a bridge between the two approaches; to propose and, in
a limited way, test a theory of endogenous productivity growth that gives a central position to
uncertainty. At the heart of our theory is a propagation mechanism — how exogenous shocks
generate endogenous productivity movements — and its interaction with ﬁnancial markets.
The ﬁrst part of the paper develops a model that focuses on the cyclical behavior of the com-
position of investment as the main propagation channel; this choice is motivated by facts discussed
later. Entrepreneurs engage in two types of investment activity: short-term investment takes rel-
atively little time to build and generates output relatively fast; long-term investment takes more
time to complete but contributes more to productivity growth.
With perfect credit markets, investment choices are dictated merely by an opportunity-cost
eﬀect. As long as short-term returns are more cyclical than long-term returns, the opportunity cost
of long-term investment is lower in recessions than in booms.2 The fraction of savings allocated to
long-term investment is therefore countercyclical and, by implication, the endogenous component
of productivity grows faster when coming out of a recession than otherwise.
But with suﬃciently imperfect credit markets, long-term investment becomes procyclical and
the business cycle is now ampliﬁed. This is not so much because borrowing constraints limit the
ability to invest; in our model the interest rate adjusts in general equilibrium so that neither type
of investment is constrained ex ante. It is rather because tighter constraints imply a higher risk
that long-term investment will be interrupted by some (idiosyncratic) liquidity shock ex post. This
risk in turn reduces the entrepreneurs’ willingness to engage in long-term investment ex ante — and
the more so in recessions, when liquidity is expected to be scarce. Aggregate shocks therefore have
a more pronounced eﬀect on productivity growth when credit markets are less eﬀective.
The second part of the paper confronts the implications of the model with the data. We ﬁrst
examine whether there is evidence of ampliﬁcation per se. For that purpose, we look at a panel
of about 60 countries over the 1960-1995 period and use export-weighted commodity price shocks
as our measures of exogenous shocks to the economy. We ﬁnd the negative growth impact of an
adverse price shock, especially at two lags, to be stronger in countries with tighter credit.
1Though the idea that there is a close connection between productivity growth and the business cycle goes back
at least to Schumpeter, Hicks, and Kaldor in the 1940s-1950s.
2An opportunity-cost eﬀect of this kind has emphasized by Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) and more recently by
Barlevy (2004).
1Financial development in these regressions does not appear to be capturing the role of other
policies or institutions. The interaction between shocks and private credit remains signiﬁcant
once we control for the interaction between shocks and intellectual property rights, government
expenditures, inﬂation, and the black-market premium.
We next examine the transmission channel by looking at the response of the rate and the com-
position of investment to shocks. For that purpose, we proxy the fraction of long-term productivity-
enhancing investments by the ratio of R&D to total investment. Data availability then limits the
analysis to a panel of 14 OECD countries over the 1973-1999 period. Consistent with the predic-
tions of our model, we ﬁnd that the composition of investment is more sensitive to shocks when the
level of private credit is lower. On the other hand, and in contrast to the standard credit-multiplier
paradigm (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989), we ﬁnd no evidence that the total rate of investment
is more responsive to shocks when private credit lower.
W h i l ew ea r ep r o b a b l yt h eﬁr s tt ol o o ka tt h ee ﬀects of shocks on the composition of investment
and thereby on growth in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints, there is a literature that looks at
the related but distinct question of how volatility aﬀects growth. Most notably, Ramey and Ramey
(1995) ﬁnd a negative relation between the two in cross-country data; this relation is robust to
various controls, perhaps suggesting a negative causal eﬀect of volatility on growth.3
Such a causal eﬀect of volatility on growth would be consistent with the neoclassical growth
paradigm if volatility discourages the demand for investment more than it encourages the pre-
cautionary supply of savings. In an AK economy, for example, the general-equilibrium impact
of aggregate risk on savings and thereby on growth is negative if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is higher than one (Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti, 2000).4
It is however unclear that this is the right explanation for the observed correlation. First, the
impact of volatility persists even after we control for the aggregate investment rate. This is shown
in columns 1-4 of Table 1, which repeat some of Ramey and Ramey’s (1995) basic speciﬁcations in
our data set. For example, in the speciﬁcation that includes initial income, education, and policy
and demographics variables as in Levine et al. (2000), the point estimate of the volatility coeﬃcient
falls from −0.26 to −0.22 when the investment rate is included in the controls. Prima facie, this
ﬁnding suggests that the main channel through which volatility aﬀects growth is not the overall
propensity to save — one reason why we chose to focus on the composition of investment.
[insert Table 1 here]
3Similar evidence is provided by Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004), Koren and Tenreyro (2004), and our
own results in Section 5.4. Chatterjee and Shukayev (2005), however, argue that this relation is not always robust to
diﬀerent regression speciﬁcations or country samples.
4The results in Angeletos (2004) suggest that the relevant threshold for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
may be quite lower in a neoclassical economy where, unlike in an AK economy, capital is not the only source of
income.
2Second, the relation may be partly spurious, driven by the eﬀect that ﬁnancial development — a
factor that Ramey and Ramey did not control for — has on both growth and volatility. This point
is consistent with our model, where tighter credit constraints imply a lower and a more procyclical
long-term investment and therefore a slower and more variable growth process. It is also consistent
with the standard credit-multiplier paradigm, which proposes that ﬁnancial frictions amplify the
business cycle via their eﬀect on the variability of aggregate investment. But whereas there is
evidence that credit predicts growth and volatility, a ﬁrst pass of the data shows no indication that
credit predicts the variability of the investment rate.
In our sample, the cross-country correlation between the mean growth rate and the ratio of
private credit to GDP (the measure of ﬁnancial development usually used in the literature) is 0.40;
the correlation between the volatility of the growth rate and private credit is −0.48. As shown in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, the eﬀect of credit on volatility is robust to various controls; the same is
true for mean growth (see Levine, 1997, for a review). By contrast, the correlation between private
credit and the standard deviation of the rate of investment to GDP is nearly zero (only −0.09);a n d
when in columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 we repeat the same regressions as in columns 5 and 6 now using
the standard deviation of the investment rate as the dependent variable, we ﬁnd no relationship
between the latter and the quality of the ﬁnancial sector — another reason why we chose to focus
on the composition rather than the rate of investment as the main transmission channel.
At the end of the empirical section we thus revisit the relation between volatility and growth
in the cross-section. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of volatility on growth survives when we control for
the level of ﬁnancial development, leaving open the possibility that volatility has a causal eﬀect on
growth (or, of course, that there may be some other omitted variable not captured by private credit
and the other controls). In our model, the causal eﬀect can go either direction, partly because the
eﬀect of aggregate volatility on the level of idiosyncratic liquidity risk is ambiguous in general. An
interesting possibility, however, emerges in examples where liquidity risk increases with aggregate
volatility. Higher volatility then discourages long-term investment and slows down growth, and the
m o r es ot h et i g h t e rt h ec r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t s .C o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h i sp o s s i b i l i t y ,w eﬁnd in our sample
that the negative relation between volatility on growth tends to be stronger in countries with lower
ﬁnancial development. This ﬁnding, however, should be taken with caution, for it looses signiﬁcance
when we instrument volatility with the standard deviation of commodity price shocks.
Related literature. The growth and ampliﬁcation eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions have been
the subject of a large literature, including Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Banerjee and Newman
(1991), King and Levine (1993), Obstfeld (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998), Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999).5 We depart from this earlier work by focusing
on how liquidity risk interacts with the horizon of investment and how this in turn aﬀects the
5See Levine (1997) for an excellent review and more references.
3cyclical composition of investment. Angeletos (2004) also considers how idiosyncratic risk aﬀects
the cyclical allocation of investment, but focuses on private versus public equity.
King and Rebelo (1993), Stadler (1990), and Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti (2000) analyze
t h er e l a t i o nb e t w e e nv o l a t i l i t ya n dg r o w t hw i t h i nt h eAK class of models, but do not consider the
cyclical behavior of the allocation of investment nor the role of ﬁnancial markets. Hall (1991), Gali
and Hammour (1991), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), and Barlevy (2004) examine the cross-sectoral
allocation of investment, but assume perfect capital markets, thus bypassing the interaction eﬀects
identiﬁed here.6
Related are also Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). The
ﬁrst paper examines the implications of adjustment costs for volatility and the cleansing eﬀect of
recessions. The second argues that lower levels of income, by constraining the ability to diversify
sector-speciﬁc risks, may lead to both higher volatility and lower growth.7 By contrast, this paper
focuses on the interaction of credit constraints and the composition of investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 analyzes
the composition of investment and Section 4 the implications for growth and volatility. Section 5
contains the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of two-period-lived agents (“entrepreneurs”),
who are indexed by i and uniformly distributed over the segment [0,1].I nt h eﬁrst period of her
life, an entrepreneur receives an exogenous endowment of wealth and decides how much to invest
in short-term versus long-term investment. Short-term investment produces at the end of the ﬁrst
period, whereas long-term investment produces at the end of the second period. In between, a
random liquidity shock is realized, which threatens to reduce the return of long-term investment if
not ﬁnanced. At the end of the second period, the entrepreneur consumes her total life-time income
and dies. The life-span of an entrepreneur is illustrated in Figure 1 and further explained below.
Productivity and exogenous shocks. Aggregate productivity has two components: an
exogenous and an endogenous one. We denote the endogenous component in period t with Tt
and call it the level of knowledge; the determination of Tt will be described later. The exogenous
component, on the other hand, is denoted by at a n di sa s s u m e dt of o l l o waM a r k o vp r o c e s sw i t h
support [a,a] ⊆ R+, unconditional mean normalized to 1, and conditional mean Et−1at = a
ρ
t−1,
where ρ ∈ (0,1) parametrizes the persistence in exogenous productivity.
6Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), on the other hand, consider a Schumpeterian growth model in which cycles are
generated by ﬁrms’ incentives to synchronize their innovations, as in Shleifer (1986).
7Koren and Tenreyro (2004), however, argue that, contrary to the portfolio-diversiﬁcation approach, less developed
countries specialize in sectors with relatively higher, not lower, risks.
4•  productivity at is realized 
•  period-t agents are born 
•  agents borrow and lend to 
 invest in kit and zit 
•  kit returns atf(kit)  
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•  period-t agents consume and die 
•  period-t+1 agents are born  … 
period t 
day     night 
 period t+1 
 day  
Figure 1: The life of an entrepreuneur.
Short-term and long-term investment. Consider an entrepreneur born in period t. In
the beginning of life, the entrepreneur receives an endowment of wealth, Wi
t, and decided how to
allocate it between short-run investment, Ki
t, long-term investment, Zi
t, and savings in the riskless
bond, Bi
t. To ensure a balanced-growth path, we assume that the initial endowment and the costs









t/Tt the “detrended” levels of wealth, short-term investment,
long-term investment, and bonds holdings. We also assume that wi
t = w for some constant w>0,




t ≤ w. (1)
Short-term investment takes only one step to complete, namely the initial investment Ki
t in the




at the end of the same period, where π is a neoclassical production function (i.e., such that π0 >
0 >π 00, π0(0) = ∞, and π0(∞)=0 ) .
Long-term investment, on the other hand, takes two steps to complete: the initial investment Zi
t
incurred in the beginning of the ﬁrst period and an additional random adjustment cost Ci
t incurred





at the end of the second period if this additional cost has been met, and nothing otherwise, where q
8Here we are in eﬀect ruling out any inﬂuence of the quality of ﬁnancial markets the volatility of the aggregate
investment rate, which is consistent with the evidence discussed in the introduction. We are also ruling out any
inﬂuence on the mean investment rate; this is certainly not true in the data, but it is not important for the paper:
none of the results is aﬀected if we let w be an increasing function of µ.
5is also a neoclassical production function (q0 > 0 >q 00, q0(0) = ∞,q 0(∞) ≤ 0). To ensure a balanced
growth path, we assume that Ci
t is proportional to Tt and let ci
t = Ci
t/Tt be independently identically
distributed across agents and periods, with support [0,¯ c], cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) F,
and density f. Unless otherwise stated, we further simplify by assuming that the c.d.f. is isoelastic:
F (c)=( c/¯ c)
φ , with φ>0.
Remarks. Note that the return to each type of investment depends on the corresponding
contemporaneous productivity shock (i.e., at for the short-term investment, at+1 for the long-term
one), whereas both depend on the level of knowledge that the entrepreneur learns in the beginning
of his life (i.e., Tt). The ﬁrst assumption is essential: together with the assumption that at is mean-
reverting, it ensures that the return to short-term investment is more cyclical than the return
to long-term investment. The second assumption is less important: assuming that the output of
long-term investment depends on Tt+1 rather than Tt would not change any of the results.9 The
assumption that Πi
t+1 includes Ci
t is also inessential: it simply ensures that Ci
t represents a pure
liquidity shock. That is, since at+1Ttq(zi
t) > 0, it is always optimal for the ﬁrm to pay the additional
cost whenever it can, which in turn depends upon the eﬃciency of credit markets.
There are various interpretations of what the two types of investment and the liquidity shock
represent. For example, the short-term investment might be putting money into one’s current
business, while long-term productivity-enhancing investment may be starting a new business. Or,
the short-term investment may be maintaining existing equipment or buying a machine of the
same vintage as the ones already installed, while the long-term investment is building an additional
plant, investing in R&D, learning a new skill, or adopting a new technology. Similarly, the liquidity
shock might be an extra cost necessary for the new technology to be adapted to domestic market
conditions once the new technology has been adopted; or a health problem which the entrepreneur
needs to overcome or otherwise she won’t be alive to enjoy the fruits of her long-term investment;
or some other idiosyncratic shock that is threatening to ruin the entrepreneur’s business unless she
has enough liquidity to overcome it.10
Entrepreneur’s payoﬀ. The entrepreneur is risk neutral and consumes only in the last period












t is the entrepreneur’s ﬁnal-period wealth and  i
t is an indicator variable such that  i
t =1if
the ﬁrm meets its liquidity shock and  i










9This would introduce a complementarity in long-term investment across entrepreneurs, which in turn would
increase its countercyclicality under complete markets and its procyclicality under tight constraints.
10The fact that long-term productivity-enhancing investments — such as setting up a new business, learning a new
skill, adopting a new technology, or engaging in R&D — are largely intangible explains why a relatively large fraction
of the value of such investments may not be tradeable and may therefore be lost in case the liquidity shock is not
met. The assumption that everything is lost is then only for simplicity.
6Credit markets. Credit markets open twice every period. The “day” market takes place at the
beginning of the period, before the realization of the liquidity or long-term investment adjustment
cost. The “overnight” market takes place at the end of the period, after the realization of the
liquidity cost.
In the day market the entrepreneur can borrow up to m times her initial wealth (m ≥ 0).T h ee x
ante borrowing constraint can thus be expressed as ki
t+zi
t ≤ µw, where µ ≡ 1+m ≥ 1. Similarly, in




t, for the purpose of covering the liquidity cost Ci
t. Thus, the probability
that the entrepreneur will be able to meet the liquidity shock and enjoy the fruits of his long-term



















Finally, to simplify the analysis, we assume that wealth cannot be stored during the day, whereas
overnight storage can take place at a one-to-one rate and ¯ c ≤ aπ(ˆ k(a)), where ˆ k(a) is the solution
to aπ0(ˆ k)=aρq0(1 − ˆ k). The ﬁrst assumption implies that the “day” interest rate rt will adjust so
that the excess aggregate demand for the riskless bond in the day market is zero; this is equivalent





The second assumption ensures that the “overnight” interest rate is zero.
Endogenous growth. To complete the model, we need to describe the endogenous productiv-
ity process, that is, the dynamics of Tt. Assuming that the knowledge accumulated by one generation
spills over to the next generation and identifying the knowledge produced by each entrepreneur in







This is essentially the same as assuming that productivity growth is increasing in the level of
productivity-enhancing investment (e.g., R&D), as usually done in endogenous-growth models.11
3 Cyclical composition of investment
In this section we analyze the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the level and the cyclical behavior
of the two types of investment. We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case of complete ﬁnancial markets;
we then contrast it with the case of tight credit constraints.
11See for example Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1999) and Aghion-Howitt (1998).
73.1 Complete markets
When credit markets are perfect, entrepreneurs can always meet their liquidity shocks, ensuring






which the entrepreneurs maximize with respect to (ki
t,zi
t,b i
t) subject to the budget constraint (1).
Obviously, all entrepreneurs make identical choices and therefore we can drop the i superscripts.
Since π and q are both strictly concave, the following ﬁrst-order conditions are both necessary and
suﬃcient for an optimal solution:
atπ0(kt)=1+rt and Etat+1q0(zt)=1+rt.










which is increasing in at as long as ρ<1.
In equilibrium, the (day) interest rate rt adjusts so that the excess demand for the bond is zero,
or equivalently that the resource constraint is satisﬁed:
kt + zt = w. (5)
This essentially imposes that the supply of savings is acyclical.12 Combining (4) and (5) implies
that, in general equilibrium, an increase in at reduces zt, increases kt and increases rt.
Proposition 1 Under complete markets, the share of short-term investment is procyclical, whereas
the share of long-term investment is countercyclical.
Note that, by (5), the aggregate level of investment is acyclical, but its composition is not. As
long as there is mean-reversion in the business cycle, proﬁts in the immediate future (i.e., the return
to short-term investment) is more sensitive to the contemporaneous state of the economy than the
present value of proﬁts anticipated further in the future (i.e., the return to long-term investment).
In other words, the demand for both types of investment is procyclical, but the demand for long-
term investment is less procyclical than the demand for short-term investment, which explains why
in equilibrium zt is countercyclical under complete markets.
12That in equilibrium every entrepreneur holds no bonds follows from our assumption that all entrepreneurs are
ex ante identical and that the net supply of the bond is zero.
8Example 1. Suppose that π(k)=kα and q(z)=zα, 0 <α<1. Condition (4) then reduces
to (kt/zt)1−α = a
1−ρ














where η =( 1− ρ)/(1 − α) > 0. Hence, zt is countercyclical (i.e., decreasing in at),w h e r e a skt is
procyclical (i.e., increasing in at).
3.2 Incomplete markets
Credit constraints limit entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity to a ﬁnite multiple of their current wealth


























t]) is simply the probability that the liquidity shock will be met
(equivalently, that long-term investment will pay out).
We assume that π,q, and F are such that the objective in (6) is strictly concave; the ﬁrst-order
conditions are then both necessary and suﬃcient and all entrepreneurs make identical choices in
equilibrium (so that we can again drop the i subscripts). The assumption of no storage within
periods implies that the ﬁrst constraint is never binding in equilibrium; by the resource constraint
(3), we indeed have kt+zt = w<µ w .The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ki
t and zi
t can then
be expressed as follows:
atπ0(kt)+Etat+1q(zt)f (µxt)µ
£
atπ0(kt) − (1 + rt)
¤
=1+rt,
Etat+1q0(zt)F (µxt) − Etat+1q(zt)f (µxt)µ(1 + rt)=1+rt,
where xt = atπ(kt)+( 1+rt)bt. The condition for kt is obviously satisﬁed at
atπ0(kt)=1+rt, (7)
which means that the demand for kt is not aﬀected by credit constraints. The condition for zt, on







The demand for long-term investment is thus no more than under complete markets.
9In equilibrium, the interest rate rt adjusts so that bt =0and therefore kt + zt = w and
xt = atπ(kt).L e t¯ µ ≡ ¯ c/(¯ aπ(1)). Note that µ ≤ ¯ µ suﬃces for µxt < ¯ c to hold for all at, in which
case F (µxt) < 1,f(µxt) > 0, and the term in brackets in (8) is strictly greater than one.
Proposition 2 Suppose µ ≤ ¯ µ. For any realization at, incomplete markets lead to a lower interest
rate rt, a higher short-term investment kt, and a lower long-term investment zt as compared to
complete markets.
Next consider the cyclical behavior of investment. Using F (µxt) = (µatπ(kt)/¯ c)
φ along with
(7), (8), and Etat+1 = a
ρ












Together with the resource constraint, zt+kt = w, the above condition implies that zt is increasing
(decreasing) in at if 1 − ρ − φ<0( > 0).
Proposition 3 Suppose µ ≤ ¯ µ and φ>1−ρ. The share of long-term investment is now procyclical
and that of short-term investment is countercyclical.
The intuition for this result is simple. The opportunity-cost eﬀect, which tends to make the
relative demand for long-term investment countercyclical, is equally present under complete and
incomplete markets. But a second eﬀect emerges when µ ≤ ¯ µ, for then the probability that the
liquidity shock will not be met is less than one in all states and, most importantly, is higher in a
recession than in a boom. This liquidity-risk eﬀect tends to make the relative demand for long-term
investment procyclical. The condition φ>1−ρ then ensures that this latter eﬀect dominates: the
opportunity-cost eﬀect is weaker the higher the persistence ρ in the business cycle, whereas the
liquidity-risk eﬀect is stronger the higher the cyclical elasticity φ of the probability of meeting the
liquidity shock.
Finally, note that µ controls primarily the average level of liquidity risk, whereas φ controls its
cyclical elasticity. Although the two parameters are unrelated in our model, lower levels of ﬁnancial
development may be typically associated with both a higher mean level and a higher cyclicality of
liquidity risk. Moreover, in our model, the cyclicality of liquidity risk is also aﬀected by µ when
µ>¯ µ, for then a higher µ implies a larger region of at for which the liquidity risk becomes zero and
therefore becomes locally insensitive to ﬂuctuations in at. For these reasons, in the empirical part
of the paper we shall identify lower ﬁnancial development in the data to a combination of lower µ
and higher φ in the model.
Example 2. Suppose π(k)=kα,q (z)=zα,α<1, ¯ c =1 , and 1 − ρ<φ<(1 − α)/α.13
13The assumption φ<(1 − α)/α suﬃces for the objective in (6) to be strictly concave and therefore for the
ﬁrst-order conditions to be suﬃcient.
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Figure 2: The eﬀect of credit constraints (µ) on the level, the cyclical elasticity, and the survival
rate of productivity-enhancing investment.




where ψ(z)=z1−α (w − z)
−φα (w − (1 + φ)z)
−1 . Clearly, ψ(z) increases with z,whereas µφaφ+ρ−1
increases with µ and a. (10) can thus be solved for zt as an increasing function of µ and at.
Example 3. Suppose the same technologies as in the above example, but now let the distribu-
tion of c be log-normal, in which case the elasticity φ becomes endogenous. Figure 2 illustrates the
impact of µ on the equilibrium level of long-term investment zt, its cyclical elasticity ∂ lnzt/∂ lnat,
and its survival rate, δ (at)=F (µatπ (kt)) (all evaluated at at =1 ). In this example, too, tighter
constraints lead to a lower average and more procyclical long-term investment.
4A m p l i ﬁcation, volatility and growth
In this section, we analyze how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect aggregate volatility, mean growth, and
the relation between the two.
4.1 Complete markets
Under complete ﬁnancial markets, productivity-enhancing investment is never interrupted. Hence,
letting z∗(at) denote the complete-markets equilibrium level of long-term investment, the growth
rate of technology is
Tt+1
Tt
= γ∗ (at) ≡ q (z∗(at)).
Since z∗(at) is decreasing in at, γ∗ (at) is also decreasing in at.
Corollary 1 Under complete markets, the endogenous component of productivity growth is coun-
tercyclical and therefore mitigates the business cycle.
11Consider next the causal eﬀect of volatility on growth. Whether a higher variance in at results in
higher or lower mean growth ultimately depends upon the curvatures of q (·) and z (·). In the Cobb-
Douglas case of Example 1 in Section 3.1, it is easy to check that γ∗ (·) is necessarily convex at least
in a neighborhood of the mean productivity shock. A small mean-preserving spread in at starting
from zero variance then necessarily increases the mean rate of technological growth. In general,
however, γ (·) may have both convex and concave segments and therefore the complete-markets
eﬀect of volatility on growth is a priori ambiguous.
4.2 Incomplete markets
Since only those ﬁrms that can meet their adjustment costs are able to innovate and thereby
contribute to aggregate productivity growth, the growth rate of technology is now given by
Tt+1
Tt
= γ (at) ≡ q (z(at))δ(at)
where z(at) is the incomplete-markets equilibrium level of long-term investment and δ(at) ≡
F (µatπ (w − z(at))) is the equilibrium probability of covering the liquidity shock (by the law of
large numbers, this is also equal to the equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs who successfully over-
come their liquidity shocks). Clearly, µ ≤ ¯ µ and φ>1−ρ suﬃce for δ (at) < 1 and z (at) <z ∗ (at)
to hold for all at, as well as for both δ (at) and zt (at) to be strictly increasing in at. It follows that
γ (at) <γ ∗ (at) for all at, and that γ (at) is strictly increasing in at.
Corollary 2 Under suﬃciently incomplete markets (i.e., for µ ≤ ¯ µ and φ>1−ρ), the endogenous
component of productivity growth is procyclical and therefore ampliﬁes the business cycle. Moreover,
productivity growth is strictly less than that under complete markets in all states.
Note how the ampliﬁcation result contrasts with the mitigating eﬀect of long-term investment
under complete markets (Corollary 1). While the opportunity-cost eﬀect implies that long-term
investment and therefore productivity growth are countercyclical under complete markets, the
liquidity-risk eﬀect contributes to making productivity growth procyclical under incomplete mar-
kets via two channels: ﬁrst, by imputing procyclicality in the demand for long-term investment;
and second, by making the success probability of long-term investments higher in booms than in
recessions.
Consider now the relationship between volatility and growth. For any given variance in at,
a reduction in µ both increases the variance and reduces the mean of Tt+1/Tt. The negative
cross-country correlation between growth volatility and mean growth observed in the data may
therefore reﬂect a spurious correlation imputed by cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial develop-
ment. Moreover, this negative correlation need not diminish once one controls for the level of
aggregate investment; what matters is the composition of investment.
12The causal eﬀect of exogenous volatility on mean growth, on the other hand, depends again on
the curvatures of q (·) and z (·), as well as that of δ (·). As with complete markets, the curvature
of z (·) is ambiguous. Moreover, the curvature of δ (·) depends on the distribution of the liquidity
shock. The causal eﬀect of a mean-preserving spread in at on the mean of Tt+1/Tt thus remains
ambiguous in general. Nevertheless, the following examples provide some insight into the causal
eﬀect of volatility under incomplete markets.
Example 4. Suppose that the adjustment cost c is 0 with probability p ∈ (0,1) and ¯ c>0 with
probability 1 − p. Suppose further that z (at)=ˆ z ∈ (0,w) for all at, that is, ignore the cyclicality
in long-term investment. Normalizing π(w − ˆ z)=q (ˆ z)=1 , it follows that
γ(at)=δ(at)=
(
1 if µat ≥ ¯ c
p if µat < ¯ c
Moreover, recall that the productivity shock at has unconditional mean 1 and support [a,¯ a].
When µ>¯ c, ﬁrms face no liquidity risk in the absence of macroeconomic volatility (i.e., when
a =¯ a =1 )or, more generally, as long as volatility is small enough that a > ¯ c/µ. But as soon as
a < ¯ c/µ, a mean-preserving spread in at decreases mean growth by increasing the probability that
the economy will be in a (suﬃciently severe) slump where a positive fraction of ﬁrms fail to meet
their liquidity shocks and complete their long-term investments.
When µ<¯ c, on the other hand, only a fraction of ﬁrms succeed in completing their long-term
investments in the absence of volatility or, more generally, as long as ¯ a<¯ c/µ. But, as soon as
¯ a>¯ c/µ, a mean-preserving spread in at now increases mean growth by increasing the probability
that the economy will enter a suﬃciently good boom where all long-term investments are completed.
This example highlights an important reason why the causal eﬀect of volatility on growth may
be non-monotonic under incomplete markets. When liquidity shocks and credit constraints are
suﬃciently severe that the mean probability of success is very low, higher volatility may increase
mean growth by increase the chances for “resurrection”; otherwise higher volatility is likely to
decrease mean growth by increasing the chances for failure.
Example 5. Suppose that z (at)=ˆ z for all at, as in the previous example, but now let c be
uniform over [0,¯ c]. Normalizing again π (w − ˆ z)=q (ˆ z)=1 , we now have
γ(at)=δ(at)=m i n{µat/¯ c,1}.
Whereas δ (·) was S-shaped (i.e., convex for low a,c o n c a v ef o rh i g ha) in the previous example, now
it is globally concave. In other words, the resurrection eﬀect discussed above has now disappeared.
It follows that a suﬃciently large mean-preserving spread in at necessarily reduces mean growth.
Furthermore, if µ>¯ c, t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of volatility on mean growth is higher the lower µ.


















Figure 3: The eﬀect of uncertainty (σ) on growth and volatility; dashed lines for perfect markets,
solid lines for tight credit constraints.
Example 6. Consider the same speciﬁcation as in Example 3 of Section 3.2, but now assume
that lnat follows a Gaussian AR(1) and let σ denote the standard deviation of the innovations
in at. Figure 3 illustrates how the mean and the standard deviation of the growth rate Tt+1/Tt
vary with σ. The dashed lines represent complete credit markets (µ = ∞), whereas the solid ones
correspond to incomplete markets (µ<∞).
For any level of σ, incomplete markets are associated with lower growth and higher volatility
than complete markets. Moreover, an increase in σ has a strong negative eﬀect on mean growth
under incomplete markets. This is explained by two factors. First, the average liquidity risk is
relatively small, which ensures that the resurrection eﬀect is weak. Second, as the innovation
probability δ(a) tends to be concave in a, the optimal level of long-term investment z (a) also
tends to be concave in a under suﬃciently incomplete markets, whereas it is convex at least in a
neighborhood of the mean productivity level under complete markets; the concavity of z (a) then
implies that an increase in σ tends to reduce the mean level of z.
5 Empirical analysis
In this section we test the main predictions of the model in a panel of countries over the 1960-2000
period. We construct a measure of exogenous shocks using export-weighted changes in international
commodity prices, as described in detail below. We then ask whether a lower level of ﬁnancial
development increases the responsiveness of growth to exogenous shocks (ampliﬁcation eﬀect) and
whether this eﬀect is channeled through the rate or the composition of investment (ampliﬁcation
channel). We also revisit the relation between volatility and growth in the cross-section of countries.
5.1 Data description
As a measure of ﬁnancial development we use private credit, the value of credit extended to the
private sector by banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries as a share of GDP. This is a standard
14indicator in the ﬁnance and growth literature and it comes from Levine, Loyaza and Beck (2000).
It is usually preferred to other measures of ﬁnancial development because it excludes credit granted
to the public sector and funds provided from central or development banks.
We compute annual growth as the log diﬀerence of per capita income from the Penn World
Tables mark 6.1 (PWT). The measures of growth and volatility used in Tables 1 and 7 are the
country-speciﬁc means and standard deviations of annual growth over the 1960-1995 period.
To study the responsiveness of the economy to exogenous shocks, we construct the following
proxy. Using data on the international prices of 42 products between 1960 and 2000 from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics Database of the IMF (IFS), we calculate the annual inﬂation/deﬂation
rate for each commodity. We then average the share of this commodity in a country’s exports
in 1985, 1986, and 1987 as reported in the World Trade Analyzer (WTA).14 Finally, we take a
weighted average of price changes across all commodities using the corresponding export shares as
weights. We thus obtain a country-by-year-speciﬁcm e a s u r e ,w h i c hw ec a l lcommodity-price shocks.
To test whether there is any ampliﬁcation eﬀect of ﬁnancial constraints, we examine the vari-
ation in the sensitivity of growth to commodity-price shocks across diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial
development. To analyze the ampliﬁcation channel, on the other hand, we also need data on the
composition of investment. The model makes predictions for the share of long-term productivity-
enhancing investment; we proxy this by the share of R&D in total investment. Unfortunately, data
availability limits our sample to 14 OECD countries between 1973-1999 for which the OECD re-
ports spending on research and development in the ANBERD database. We combine this measure
with data on total investment as a share of GDP from the PWT.
When analyzing the reaction of the economy to shocks we also control for overall property
rights (property) and intellectual property rights (ipr). The former is a broad measure from various
editions of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World database, whereas the latter is
a narrower index constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997). For these variables we use the data as
compiled by Caselli and Wilson (2003).15
Finally, the demographics data comes from the PWT; the schooling data from Barro and Lee
(1997); and the various policy variables used in Tables 1 and 7 — the share of government in GDP,
inﬂation, the black market exchange rate premium, and openness to trade — from Levine et al.
(2000).
5.2 Ampliﬁcation eﬀe c to fc r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t s
We begin by examining the sensitivity of growth to shocks in a panel of 72 countries and 6 periods,
where a period consists of 5 consecutive non-overlapping years between 1960 and 1990. We estimate
14These were the earliest years for which complete data were available at the country-commodity level.
15Data on property rights and intellectual property rights is only available at 5-year intervals. We annualize the
data by imposing a constant growth rate within each 5-year period.
15the following speciﬁcation:
∆yit = α0 + α1 · yit + α2 · shockit + α3 · crediti_
+γ · crediti_ · shockit + β · Xit + µi + εit
(11)
where ∆yit is growth for country i in period t, yit is beginning-of-period per capita income (in logs),
and Xit is a vector of controls (namely, period-average population growth and secondary school
enrollment). To address the potential for omitted intransient country-level variables, we include
country ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster errors by country.
We consider two alternative measures for credit.I n t h e ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 we use
the average value of private credit over the contemporaneous 5-year interval. In accordance with
previous ﬁndings in the literature, we observe a negative coeﬃcient on initial income (evidence of
convergence) and a strong positive overall eﬀect of credit. As expected, the overall impact of shock
on ∆y is also positive, because an increase in shock represents an improvement in the exporting
opportunities available to a country.
We are more interested, however, in the interaction of credit and shock. I nl i n ew i t ho u r
theoretical predictions, we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient, suggesting that ﬁnancial development reduces
the sensitivity to exogenous shocks. While the coeﬃcient is imprecisely estimated in column 1, it
becomes statistically signiﬁcant when we add time ﬁxed eﬀects in the second column.
[insert Table 2 here]
One concern with using the contemporaneous value of credit is that it varies with the business
cycle and may thus capture the impact of some other cyclical omitted variable. Note, however,
that for the interaction term to be spurious a beneﬁcial shock must be associated with both higher
growth rates and lower levels of private credit, which seems unlikely. Moreover, the estimate of
γ is robust to the introduction of either a quadratic term for shock or the interaction of y and
shock, which speaks further against such a bias (results not reported). Nevertheless, columns 3
and 4 repeat the estimation in the ﬁrst two columns with the average value of private credit over
the entire 1960-1990 period, which is immune to the above omitted variable bias. The interaction
term is now highly signiﬁcant with and without time ﬁxed eﬀects; it also increases in magnitude.
While the 1960-1990 average addresses potential bias concerns, it does not capture the signiﬁ-
cant time variation in the level of ﬁnancial development; it may thus be a poorer proxy than the
contemporaneous value of credit. For that reason, in the remaining of the paper we estimate all
speciﬁcations with both time-variant and country-ﬁxed measures of private credit.
Including time ﬁxed eﬀects, on the other hand, takes away the component in shock that is
common to all countries in a given period and therefore isolates the response to the idiosyncratic
component of shock. Although the empirical results suggest that the ampliﬁcation eﬀect of credit
16constraints diﬀers between world-wide and idiosyncratic shocks, our model does not make such a
distinction. To avoid taking a stance and explore the potentially diﬀerential eﬀects of the two shock
components, we continue the empirical analysis both with and without time ﬁxed eﬀects.16
The above results avoided the lag structure of the response of growth to shocks by aggregating
over 5-year interval. We henceforth focus on an annual panel of 65 countries between 1960 and
2000 and extend the speciﬁcation above as follows:
∆yit = α0 + δ0 · shockit + δ−1 · shockit−1 + δ−2 · shockit−2+
+γ0 · crediti_ · shockit + γ−1 · crediti_ · shockit−1 + γ−2 · crediti_ · shockit−2+
+αc · crediti_ + αy · yit−2 + µi + εit
(12)
Now ∆y is annual growth, y is per capita income lagged two years, and the three shock variables
correspond to the contemporaneous, 1-year lagged, and 2-year lagged commodity-price shocks. The
estimation of all lagged shock terms is possible because of the low autocorrelation in the commodity
price shocks.17 As before, we include country ﬁxed eﬀects and cluster errors at the country level.
Table 3 reports our results. The ﬁrst column presents our baseline speciﬁcation with a lagged
moving average of private credit over the ﬁve years immediately preceding time t. As the model
predicts, tighter credit results in higher sensitivity to shocks, especially at two lags. We obtain the
same result when we use the 1960-2000 average value of credit in column 2. The table also reports
F-statistics for the joint signiﬁcance of all three interaction terms, as well as that of only the 2
lagged interactions. In many cases, the data favor the inclusion of the interaction terms.
[insert Table 3 here]
Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample to countries in which the moving average of private credit
is always above 10% of GDP. This cut-oﬀ is motivated by the concern that variation in the measure
of credit within the 0-10% range is unlikely to be informative about the variation in the availability
of funds. Alternatively, ﬁnancial development may not importantly aﬀect the likelihood of meeting
a liquidity shock unless it is above a minimum threshold level. When we do not impose this cut-oﬀ
in columns 3 and 4 the interaction terms are less precisely estimated and lose joint signiﬁcance.
In contrast, the results are generally robust to higher cut-oﬀ v a l u e s ,s u c ha s1 5 % ,2 0 % ,o r2 5 % ;
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the ﬁrst two columns for the 20% cut-oﬀ. In light of these results, we use
16A proxy for shocks more commonly used in the growth literature is changes in the terms of trade. We prefer to
use commodity-price shocks because the time variation in exchange rates that enters the terms of trade calculation
is largely endogenous to the business cycle. In contrast, the time variation in the price of each commodity is largely
exogenous to a country, and the weights we use to aggregate across commodities vary in the cross-section but not
over time. When we use data on terms of trade shocks from Barro and Lee (1997), the interaction terms are of the
correct sign but imprecisely estimated.
17We calculated the correlation coeﬃcient between shockt and shockt−1 for each country. In our sample of 65
countries the average autocorrelation coeﬃcient was 0.08 with a standard deviation of 0.16.
17the 10% cut-oﬀ throughout the rest of the analysis.18
In columns 7 and 8 we check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of private
credit: a lagged moving average over the (t − 6,t− 10) period; and the initial value of credit,
computed for each country as the average of the ﬁrst 5 years for which credit data are available.
Both measures predate the commodity-price shocks and the length of a business cycle. Columns
9 and 10, on the other hand, add year ﬁxed eﬀects and thus isolate the response to idiosyncratic
shocks. The results are largely unchanged, although the signiﬁcance of the interaction terms varies
across speciﬁcations.
We next address another omitted-variable concern: the possibility that our estimates capture
the interaction eﬀect of some other institutional variable. For example, if property rights are
positively correlated with credit availability and growth reacts less to adverse shocks in countries
with better property rights, the interaction terms reported in Table 3 may reﬂect the mitigating
eﬀect of property rights rather than that of ﬁnancial development.
[insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 thus revisits the baseline speciﬁcations of Table 3 after controlling for other institutional
variables. For comparison, column 1 reproduces the ﬁrst column of Table 3. Column 2 adds the
interactions of shock with ipr and property. Column 3 instead includes the interactions of shock
with initial income y, a proxy for the overall level of economic development. Column 4 combines
all control interactions and column 5 adds time ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns 6 and 7 then repeat 4 and 5
using the 1960-2000 average level of credit rather than the (t−5,t−1) average. In all speciﬁcations
the private-credit interaction terms remain signiﬁcant.19,20
5.3 Ampliﬁcation channel
The evidence presented so far supports the prediction that tighter credit ampliﬁes the business
cycle, but it does not identify the transmission channel as being the composition of investment or
any other channel. In this subsection, we examine how credit aﬀects the sensitivity of both the
level and composition of investment to shocks.21
18When we estimate the same speciﬁcation in the remaining sample of countries, which fall below the 10% cut-oﬀ,
we observe highly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, although usually of the same sign. We do not really know why this group
of countries behaves diﬀerently; our guess is that there is simply too much noise in this group.
19Our results also survive the inclusion of the interaction of shock w i t ht h es i z eo fg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h eb l a c km a r k e t
premium (results not reported).
20In unreported regressions we have explored the possibility that ﬁnancial development aﬀects also the persistence
of ﬂuctuations. The interaction of private credit with y enters positively, suggesting that persistence is higher in more
ﬁnancially developed countries. This eﬀect however is not statistically signiﬁcant.
21Walde and Woitek (2004) ﬁnd that the level of R&D expenditure tends to be procyclical in the G7 countries
between 1973 and 2000. (See also Walde, 2004.) In contrast, we focus on the cyclical variation of R&D as a share of
total investment.
18Using annual data on 14 OECD countries between 1973 and 1999 we estimate the following two
regressions:
R&D/Iit = α0 + δ0 · shockit + δ−1 · shockit−1 + δ−2 · shockit−2+
+γ0 · crediti_ · shockit + γ−1 · crediti_ · shockit−1 + γ−2 · crediti_ · shockit−2+
+αc · crediti_ + αy · yit−2 + µi + εit
(13)
I/Yit = α0 + δ0 · shockit + δ−1 · shockit−1 + δ−2 · shockit−2+
+γ0 · crediti_ · shockit + γ−1 · crediti_ · shockit−1 + γ−2 · crediti_ · shockit−2+
+αc · crediti_ + αy · yit−2 + µi + εit
(14)
The dependent variables here are R&D as a share of total investment — our proxy for long-term
growth-enhancing investment — and total investment as a fraction of GDP for country i in year t.
As before, we consider contemporaneous, 1-year lagged, and 2-year lagged commodity-price shocks,
include country ﬁxed eﬀects, and cluster errors by country. Note that in the sample of countries
with R&D data we never observe values of private credit below 10%.
[insert Table 5 here]
The results from estimating (13) are reported in Table 5. Columns 1-3 use the moving average
of private credit over the immediately preceding ﬁve years, whereas columns 4-6 use the 1973-1999
average for each country. Columns 2 and 5 control for the interactions of shocks with ipr, property,
and per capita income lagged 2 years. Finally, year ﬁxed eﬀects are added in columns 3 and 6.
Although the statistical signiﬁcance of the results varies across speciﬁcations, the interaction of
shocks with credit (γ) is negative in most cases. Moreover, the total eﬀect (δ+γ·credit) is typically
positive for countries with the lowest values of credit and negative for the ones with the highest
credit. In particular, we estimate statistically and economically signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcients
on the interaction with once- and twice-lagged shocks when we include time eﬀects. Once again,
this suggests that the ampliﬁcation channel captured in this regression is more likely to reﬂect the
response of countries to idiosyncratic shocks than to common shocks.
[insert Table 6 here]
In sharp contrast with the above ﬁndings, when we turn to the results for (14) in Table 6, we
ﬁnd no evidence that tighter credit increases the sensitivity of I/Y to shocks. If anything, the
reverse is true: most interaction terms enter with a positive sign.
These ﬁndings are far from conclusive, since they are limited to a sample of OECD countries,
as p e c i ﬁc type of shocks and a speciﬁc decomposition of investment. Nevertheless, they appear to
reject the standard ampliﬁcation channel involving the level of aggregate investment, and instead
point to a composition eﬀect as in our model.
195.4 Revisiting the impact of volatility on growth
As discussed in the introduction, the negative relation between volatility and growth observed in
the cross-section of countries need not reﬂect causality. Moreover, the causal eﬀect of volatility
is ambiguous in general. An interesting possibility, however, was raised by examples 5 and 6 in
Section 4: to the extent that liquidity risk increases with aggregate volatility, volatility can have a
detrimental eﬀect on growth, and the more so the tighter the credit constraints.
[insert Table 7 here]
We examine this possibility in Table 7. In column 1 we repeat the Ramey-Ramey regression
with the addition of private credit and its interaction with volatility.22 Consistent with the insight
above, the negative impact of volatility on growth tends to be stronger in countries with lower
ﬁnancial development. This eﬀect is economically important: in column 1, for example, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the average level of ﬁnancial development reduces the impact of a
1% rise in volatility by −0.68% (= 0.018 · 38).
The interaction eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of demographics, property rights and policy
controls, and independent of the overall level of investment, as columns 2-4 show. It may be biased,
however, because of the endogeneity of volatility. For that reason, columns 5-8 repeat the regressions
instrumenting volatility with the standard deviation of commodity-price shocks. The interaction
term now remains of the right sign and comparable magnitude but loses statistical signiﬁcance,
which may be due to the fact that commodity-price shocks explain only a small fraction of total
volatility.
Further research is therefore necessary before a solid causal interpretation of the above ﬁnding
can be established.23 Nevertheless, at ﬁrst pass the data appear to suggest that the potentially
detrimental causal eﬀect of volatility on growth is larger in countries with lower ﬁnancial develop-
ment, which may have important implications for welfare and policy.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper investigated how ﬁnancial development aﬀects the cyclical composition of investment
and the implications this has for volatility and growth. We ﬁrst considered a simple model that
endogenizes productivity-enhancing investment over the business cycle. We found that credit con-
straints make the fraction of productivity-enhancing investment more procyclical, thus amplifying
the variation in productivity and output even if they fail to amplify the variation in aggregate
22For consistency we present results for the countries that meet the 10% cut-oﬀ. The results are very similar in
the sample of 72 countries from Table 1.
23Supportive is also the historical evidence in Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004). Using panel data for 35
countries over the 1870-1939 period, they ﬁnd that volatility as measured by term of trade shocks is harmful for
growth in the Periphery, but not in the Core.
20savings. We then confronted these predictions with a cross-country panel and found evidence that
tighter ﬁnancial constraints make R&D investment and growth more sensitive to shocks, while also
generating a more negative correlation between volatility and growth.
The model used in this paper was highly stylized. We nevertheless expect the main insights to
extend to more general frameworks as long as the key propagation channel — the eﬀect of liquidity
risk on long-term productivity-enhancing investments — is preserved. An interesting direction for
future research would be to embed this mechanism into a full-ﬂedged RBC model and examine in
detail the implications for the economy’s impulse responses to exogenous productivity and demand
shocks.24
Another fruitful direction for future research is the interplay between macroeconomic policy
and productivity growth.25 Extending the insights of this paper regarding the causal eﬀect of
volatility on growth, Aghion, Barro and Marinescu (work in progress) investigate whether coun-
tercyclical budgetary policies have a stronger positive eﬀect on long-run growth in less ﬁnancially
developed countries. Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, and Rogoﬀ (2005), on the other hand, examine
the relationship between ﬁnancial development, the choice of exchange-rate regime, and growth
performance.
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24(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
initial income -0.0019 -0.0175 -0.0094 -0.0163 -0.0063 -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0061
(-0.69) (-5.66)*** (-3.89)*** (-5.98)*** (-1.87)* (-1.11) (-1.38) (-1.01)
growth volatility  -0.2796 -0.2641 -0.1829 -0.2208
(-2.63)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.14)** (-2.63)**
investment/GDP 0.1742 0.0963
(6.47)*** (3.96)***
private credit -0.00024 -0.00012 0.00003 0.00019
(-2.45)** (-0.90) (0.25) (1.11)
Controls:
pop growth, sec enroll no yes no yes no yes no yes
Levine et al. policy set no yes no yes no yes no yes
property rights no yes no yes no yes no yes
R-squared 0.0969 0.6018 0.4472 0.7013 0.2673 0.3755 0.0356 0.2856
N 70 59 70 59 70 59 70 59
Note: All regressors are averages over the 1960-1995 period, except for intellectual and property rights which are for 1970-1995 and 1970-1990
respectively. Initial income and secondary school enrollment are taken for 1960. Growth and investment volatility are constructed as the standard
deviation of annual growth and the share of total investment in GDP in the 1960-1995 period respectively. The Levine et al. policy set of controls
includes government size as a share of GDP, inflation, black market premium, and trade openness. Constant term not shown. t-statistics in
parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.





 Average growth, 1960-1995 Dependent variable:Dependent variable: 5-year avg. growth
Private credit measure:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial income -0.0701 -0.0710 -0.0481 -0.0467
(-6.60)*** (-6.00)*** (-4.68)*** (-3.74)***
shock 0.1243 0.1214 0.1686 0.1518
(2.20)** (2.09)** (2.79)*** (2.36)**
private credit 0.0387 0.0385
(2.97)*** (2.75)***
private credit*shock -0.2119 -0.2722 -0.4033 -0.4103
(-1.44) (-1.78)* (-2.24)** (-2.12)**
Controls:
pop growth, sec enroll yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
period fixed effects no yes no yes
R-squared 0.5355 0.5521 0.4788 0.4925
# countries (groups) 72 72 72 72
N 388 388 418 418
Table 2. The response of growth to commodity price shocks: 5-year avgs
Note: Commodity price shocks are export-weighted changes in the price of 42 commodities. All variables except for
private credit are averaged over 5-year non-overlapping periods from 1960 to 1990. Initial income is beginning of
period income. Private credit is averaged over the concurrent 5-year period in Columns (1) and (2) and over the 1960-
1990 period in Columns (3) and (4). All regressions include a constant term, and cluster errors at the country level. t-
statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.
1960-1990 avg private credittDependent variable: annual growth
Private credit average: (t-5,t-1) 1960-2000 (t-5,t-1) 1960-2000 (t-5,t-1) 1960-2000 (t-10,t-6) (to,to+4) (t-5,t-1) 1960-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
shock t -0.0130 0.0110 -0.0050 -0.0215 -0.0600 -0.0272 -0.0117 -0.0006 -0.0307 -0.0022
(-0.53) (0.48) (-0.24) (-0.96) (-0.59) (-0.30) (-0.59) (-0.02) (-1.33) (-0.10)
shock t-1 -0.0154 0.0019 0.0208 -0.0025 0.0133 0.0835 -0.0256 -0.0402 0.0062 -0.0011
(-0.48) (0.05) (1.01) (-0.08) (0.09) (0.92) (-0.67) (-1.23) (0.19) (-0.03)
shock t-2 0.0687 0.0651 0.0487 0.0283 -0.0028 0.0951 0.0575 0.0498 0.0584 0.0602
(2.88)*** (2.39)** (2.79)*** (1.17) (-0.03) (1.34) (2.06)** (1.85)* (2.58)** (2.18)**
priv credit 0.0174 0.0246 0.0121 0.0177 0.0109
(2.69)*** (2.92)*** (1.48) (2.05)** (1.63)
priv credit*shock t 0.0337 -0.0302 0.0205 0.0849 0.1412 0.0743 0.0274 0.0091 0.0193 -0.0757
(0.47) (-0.46) (0.32) (1.13) (0.94) (0.51) (0.47) (0.10) (0.28) (-1.08)
priv credit*shock t-1 -0.0177 -0.0863 -0.0690 -0.0240 -0.0533 -0.1822 0.0273 0.0748 0.0014 0.0071
(-0.27) (-0.89) (-0.99) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-1.21) (0.29) (0.74) (0.02) (0.08)
priv credit*shock t-2 -0.2083 -0.1980 -0.1044 -0.0556 -0.0886 -0.2423 -0.1752 -0.1936 -0.1383 -0.1819
(-3.05)*** (-2.43)** (-1.72)* (-0.65) (-0.59) (-1.80)* (-1.96)* (-1.90)* (-2.04)** (-1.94)*
Controls:
income t-2 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no no no no no no yes yes
F-tests:
all interaction terms 0.0164 0.1262 0.3955 0.6214 0.5585 0.1476 0.2108 0.1085 0.1388 0.1828
lagged interaction terms 0.0074 0.0587 0.2294 0.8004 0.8351 0.1219 0.1099 0.0758 0.0770 0.1079
R-squared 0.1739 0.1368 0.1162 0.0966 0.1935 0.1215 0.1724 0.1359 0.2317 0.1828
# countries 65 65 109 111 29 29 63 65 65 65
N 1,923 2,364 3,104 3,980 829 1,044 1,639 2,364 1,923 2,364
Table 3. The response of growth to commodity price shocks
Note: Annual 1960-2000 data, except where lost due to lags. shock t, shock t-1, shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and 2-year lagged commodity price shock. All regressions
include a constant term, and cluster errors at the country level. The sample is limited to countries whose (t-5, t-1) credit average is always above 10% of GDP (20% in Columns (5) and
(6)), except for Columns (3) and (4) where no threshold is imposed. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Baseline specifications No threshold Other credit measures Year fixed effects 20% thresholdDependent variable: annual growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
shock t -0.0130 -0.1350 -0.0073 -0.2405 -0.2176 0.0973 -0.0149
(-0.53) (-2.57)** (-0.05) (-1.39) (-1.16) (0.76) (-0.14)
shock t-1 -0.0154 -0.0069 -0.0102 0.1682 0.0781 -0.0527 -0.0298
(-0.48) (-0.09) (-0.07) (0.57) (0.25) (-0.30) (-0.18)
shock t-2 0.0687 0.0038 0.2319 0.0682 -0.0597 0.0846 0.0381
(2.88)*** (0.06) (1.28) (0.30) (-0.29) (0.59) (0.28)
priv credit 0.0174 0.0234 0.0172 0.0235 0.0180
(2.69)*** (2.41)** (2.63)** (2.42)** (1.78)*
priv credit*shock t 0.0337 0.0685 0.0394 0.0403 0.0815 -0.0830 -0.0740
(0.47) (0.67) (0.54) (0.37) (0.71) (-0.76) (-0.70)
priv credit*shock t-1 -0.0177 -0.0086 -0.0127 0.0388 0.0150 -0.1516 -0.0896
(-0.27) (-0.08) (-0.14) (0.26) (0.11) (-1.16) (-0.70)
priv credit*shock t-2 -0.2083 -0.2544 -0.1514 -0.2382 -0.2240 -0.2563 -0.2515
(-3.05)*** (-2.26)** (-1.82)* (-1.94)* (-1.90)* (-2.59)** (-2.52)**
Controls:
income t-2 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
property rights and interactions no yes no yes yes yes yes
income interactions  no no yes yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects no no no no yes no yes
F-tests:
all credit interaction terms 0.0164 0.0636 0.2950 0.1972 0.2116 0.0765 0.0847
lagged credit interaction terms 0.0074 0.0359 0.1992 0.1063 0.1390 0.0375 0.0490
R-squared 0.1739 0.2383 0.1745 0.2397 0.2993 0.1513 0.1979
# countries 65 53 65 53 53 57 57
N 1,923 1,044 1,923 1,044 1,044 2,109 2,109
Table 4. The response of growth to commodity price shocks: robustness
Note: Annual 1960-2000 data, except where lost due to lags. shock t, shock t-1, shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and 2-year
lagged commodity price shock. All regressions include a constant term, and cluster errors at the country level. The sample is limited to countries
whose (t-5, t-1) credit average is always above 10% of GDP. Private credit and the property rights terms are averaged as indicated in the
column heading. Income interactions use twice lagged per capita income in Columns (1)-(5) and the 1960-2000 average in Columns (6)-(7). t-
statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Private credit and property 
terms average:
(t-5,t-1) avg 1960-2000 avg(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock t 0.0903 1.2825 3.5864 0.2175 2.5729 5.0466
(0.34) (0.38) (0.87) (0.54) (0.18) (0.33)
shock t-1 -0.1156 5.7272 3.0835 0.3550 12.3290 24.5633
(-0.51) (2.74)** (0.86) (0.97) (1.13) (2.15)*
shock t-2 0.3867 7.2179 1.6775 0.1002 7.1779 13.4177
(1.29) (1.66) (0.42) (0.23) (0.78) (0.96)
priv credit 0.0654 0.0365 0.0252
(0.31) (0.24) (0.16)
priv credit*shockt -0.2010 -0.0233 -0.0887 -0.3391 -0.5424 -0.7318
(-0.51) (-0.07) (-0.34) (-0.63) (-0.57) (-0.84)
priv credit*shockt-1 0.0692 0.1214 0.0663 -0.5605 -0.8399 -1.2364
(0.15) (0.40) (0.19) (-0.90) (-0.94) (-2.05)*
priv credit*shockt-2 -0.8823 -0.9269 -1.0567 -0.3538 -0.9251 -2.2883
(-1.56) (-1.45) (-1.90)* (-0.52) (-0.93) (-2.16)**
Controls:
income t-2 yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
property rights and interactions no yes yes no yes yes
income interactions  no yes yes no yes yes
year fixed effects no no yes no no yes
F-tests:
all credit interaction terms 0.4076 0.1677 0.3193 0.6837 0.7677 0.0860
lagged credit interaction terms 0.2497 0.3181 0.2023 0.4878 0.6396 0.1296
R-squared 0.8396 0.9205 0.9303 0.8482 0.8534 0.8909
# countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
N 342 307 307 357 357 357
Note: Annual1973-1999data, except where lost due to lags. shock t, shock t-1, shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and
2-year lagged commodity price shock. All regressions includea constant term, and cluster errors at the country level. Private credit
and the property rights terms are averaged as indicated in the column heading. Income interactions use twice lagged per capita
income in Columns (1)-(3) and the 1973-1999 average in Columns (4)-(6). t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significantat 1%, 5%,
and 10%.
Table 5. The response of R&D to commodity price shocks
Dependent variable: R&D/investment
Private credit and property 
terms average:
(t-5,t-1) avg 1973-1999 avg(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
shock t -0.0165 1.7262 0.8266 -0.2091 1.6659 -0.3910
(-0.21) (1.24) (0.46) (-1.94)* (0.40) (-0.09)
shock t-1 0.1178 4.2493 6.0103 0.1239 5.2885 3.4971
(2.03)* (1.79)* (3.17)*** (0.88) (1.27) (0.84)
shock t-2 -0.0285 6.6502 9.8319 0.0079 7.8179 8.1249
(-0.32) (2.75)** (4.02)*** (0.07) (1.42) (1.57)
priv credit 0.0148 0.0082 0.0035
(0.57) (0.33) (0.12)
priv credit*shockt 0.0950 0.1246 0.0257 0.3392 0.3828 0.1699
(1.01) (1.17) (0.22) (2.78)** (1.78)* (0.77)
priv credit*shockt-1 -0.0579 0.1958 0.1349 -0.0327 -0.1048 0.0270
(-0.55) (1.84)* (1.52) (-0.17) (-0.48) (0.15)
priv credit*shockt-2 0.1968 0.4639 0.3315 0.1164 0.4120 0.5205
(1.25) (2.78)** (1.87)* (0.79) (2.88)** (2.66)**
Controls:
income t-2 yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
property rights and interactions no yes yes no yes yes
income interactions  no yes yes no yes yes
year fixed effects no no yes no no yes
F-tests:
all credit interaction terms 0.1428 0.0375 0.2233 0.0962 0.0003 0.1130
lagged credit interaction terms 0.1408 0.0479 0.1325 0.6900 0.0001 0.0571
R-squared 0.7331 0.7952 0.8311 0.7224 0.7355 0.7756
# countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
N 341 307 307 356 356 356
Note: Annual 1973-1999 data, except where lost due to lags. Sample limited to coutry-year observations with R&D data, as in Table 
5. shock t, shock t-1, shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and 2-year lagged commodity price shock. All regressions
include a constant term, and cluster errors at the country level. Private credit and the property rights terms are averaged as
indicated in the column heading. Income interactions use twice lagged per capita income in Columns (1)-(3) and the 1973-1999
average in Columns (4)-(6). t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 6. The response of investment to commodity price shocks
Dependent variable: Investment/GDP
Private credit and property 
terms average:
(t-5,t-1) avg 1973-1999 avgDependent variable: avg. growth, 1960-1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
initial income -0.0090 -0.0182 -0.0109 -0.0160 -0.0276 -0.0371 -0.0267 -0.0120
(-2.85)*** (-5.02)*** (-4.04)*** (-4.93)*** (-0.90) (-0.44) (-0.68) (-0.39)
growth volatility  -0.8763 -0.7260 -0.6941 -0.5772 -6.0000 -5.8680 -5.7602 -0.0495
(-3.54)*** (2.80)*** (-3.27)*** (-2.51)** (-0.63) (-0.26) (-0.40) (-0.01)
private credit -0.00037 0.00023 -0.00034 0.00007 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0031 -0.0001
(-1.80)* (0.57) (-1.94)* (0.19) (-0.46) (-0.24) (-0.35) (-0.07)
volatility*private credit 0.0184 0.0129 0.0134 0.0097 0.0939 0.0725 0.0910 0.0062
(3.19)*** (2.30)** (2.68)** (1.95)* (0.46) (0.26) (0.35) (0.09)
investment/GDP 0.1356 0.0964 0.0174 0.1286
(4.28)*** (3.16)*** (0.04) (0.53)
Controls:
pop growth, sec enroll no yes no yes no yes no yes
Levine et al. policy set no yes no yes no yes no yes
property rights no yes no yes no yes no yes
private credit
2 no yes no yes no no no no
F-test (volatility terms) 0.0039 0.0303 0.0087 0.0526 0.7651 0.9028 0.9028 0.8654
F-test (credit terms) 0.0005 0.0052 0.0218 0.0506 0.8982 0.9403 0.9403 0.8776
R-squared 0.3721 0.7467 0.5659 0.8151
N 47 42 47 42 47 42 47 42
No investment With investment
Note: All regressors are averages over the 1960-1995 period, except for intellectual and property rights which are for 1970-1995 and 1970-
1990 respectively. Initial income and secondary school enrollment are taken for 1960. Growth and commodity price shocks volatility are
constructed as the standard deviation of annual growth and commodity price shocks in the 1960-1995 period respectively. The sample is
limited to the same set of countries as in Tables 3 and 4 (countries whose (t-5, t-1) credit average is always above 10% of GDP). The Levine
et al. policy set of controls includes government size as a share of GDP, inflation, black market premium, and trade openness. Constant term
not shown. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 7. Growth, volatility and credit constraints
No investment With investment
OLS IV: commodity price shocks volatility